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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
'
to second degree murder in exchange
Giovanni Mendiola entered an ~ l f o r dplea
for an agreement on the part of the State not to seek charges against Mr. Mendiola's
two sisters and to only seek greatly reduced charges against his two brothers and his
brother-in-law. Thereafter, Mr. Mendiola filed a timely post-conviction petition that
raised claims that the package plea agreement in his case was the product of coercion,
and was therefore involuntary; that the district court failed to properly ascertain whether
or not Mr. Mendiola's plea was voluntary in light of the threatened charges against
several members of his family unless he pleaded guilty; that the district court failed to
ascertain whether there was a strong factual basis to support Mr. Mendiola's Alford
plea; and further asserted various grounds of ineffective assistance of Mr. Mendiola's
trial counsel.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Mr. Mendiola's petition
for post-conviction relief on all grounds asserted. Mr. Mendiola timely appeals from the
district court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Post-Conviction Relief, and asserts
that the district court erred when denied Mr. Mendiola's petition for post-conviction relief
in light of the numerous erroneous factual findings and legal errors that, cumulatively
and individually, demonstrated that the district court failed to properly adjudicate
Mr. Mendiota's post-conviction claims.

' North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
I

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
On October 29, 2003, Giovanni Mendiola was sentenced to life, with eight years
fixed, based upon his Alford plea of guilty to a charge of second degree murder.
(R., p.50.)

These charges arose from the death of Brendan Butler.

Tr., p.15, Ls.8-15. ')

(R., p.70 at

Mr. Mendiola entered his Alford plea in order to spare his two

sisters from prosecution, and his two brothers and former brother-in-law from facing
heightened criminal charges. (R., p.60 at Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.7, L.21.)
Thereafter, he filed a timely post-conviction petition seeking relief from his
conviction for second degree murder. (R., p.8.) In his original petition, he alleged that:
(1) his attorney was incompetent; (2) his attorney had a conflict of interest because
Mr. Mendiola's counsel had previously defended the son of the prosecutor in his case;
(3) the prosecutor coerced or extorted

Mr. Mendiola into pleading guilty based upon

threats to charge his two sisters with criminal offenses if he did not plead guilty; (4)
there was an insufficient factual basis to support his plea and the judge was aware of
the lack of proof of any intent; (5) the district court judge was biased or was operating
under a conflict of interest because the judge was a family friend of the decedent; (6)
the defense investigator in Mr. Mendiola's case improperly relayed information to the
prosecutor;

and (7) the prosecutor was biased based on the allegation that the

prosecutor's son was involved in the drug activities underpinning Mr. Mendiola's murder
conviction. (R., p.9.)

In addition, Mr. Mendiola alleged that his trial counsel was

* Because some of the transcripts from the underlying criminal case have been included
in the Clerk's Record on appeal, for ease of reference, citations to those transcripts
which are included in the Clerk's Record are made in accordance both with the page of
the Clerk's Record on which the pertinent portion of the transcripts are found and in
accordance with the internal page numbering of the underlying transcript.

ineffective for failing to provide diligent representation, misrepresenting facts to
Mr. Mendiola and his family, and providing misinforming Mr. Mendiola that pleading
guilty was in his best interests. (R., p.9.)
In response, the State asserted that Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that his petition failed to allege
sufficient facts to vest the district court with jurisdiction over his petition. (R., p.13.)
Thereafter, the district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss Mr. Mendiola's postconviction petition. (R., pp.15-17.) The basis for the court's notice of intent to dismiss
was that Mr. Mendiola's petition was unaccompanied by any affidavit or other
admissible evidence in support of his claims and that, therefore, his post-conviction
petition contained merely conclusory statements and assertions that were subject to
summary dismissal. (R., pp.15-17.)
After being granted a series of extensions, Mr. Mendiola filed an amended postconviction petition.' (R., pp.49-96.) The issues in the amended post-conviction were as
follows: (1) Mr. Mendiola's guilty plea was not freely and voluntarily entered, and the
district court failed to establish on the record that the plea was freely and voluntarily
entered; (2) the district court failed to establish a factual basis for the Alford plea despite
indications from the record that there may not have been sufficient proof for all of the
elements of the charged offense; (3) that Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel was ineffective
because a defense investigator argued in a manner contrary to Mr. Mendiola's interests
Because Mr. Mendiola's amended post-conviction petition supplants his original pro se
filed petition, references herein to Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition are made in
reference to the amended petition that Mr. Mendioia filed with the assistance of his postconviction counsel.

during the course of plea negotiations, counsel failed to attack the lack of a factual basis
for Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea, counsel failed to present evidence, of which trial counsel
either was aware or should have been aware, that would have demonstrated that
Mr. Mendiola was guilty only of manslaughter, as opposed to murder, and because trial
counsel failed to advise Mr. Mendiola of his right to appeal from his judgment of
conviction and sentence. (R., pp.49-56.) Mr. Mendiola provided the district court with
transcripts, affidavits, and other evidence in support of all of his post-conviction claims.
(R., pp.49-96.)
With regard to the assertion that Mr. Mendiola's guilty plea was not freely and
voluntarily entered, Mr. Mendiola noted that his guilty plea was part of a package
agreement in which the State agreed that federal prosecutors would forgo charges
against Mr. Mendiola's sisters, and to provide lesser charges against Mr. Mendiola's
brothers, in exchange for his guilty plea. (R., pp.50, 60 at Tr., p.5, L.6

- p.7,

L.18.)

According to Mr. Mendiola, he was not in fact guilty of the charge of second degree
murder, but pleaded guilty solely in an effort to protect his family from potential criminal
liability. (R., p.50.)
Moreover, Mr. Mendiola alleged that the district court, during the plea colloquy,
did not make a sufficient record that Mr. Mendiola's plea was actually voluntary and that
"the promise of leniency to others was not a significant consideration in the petitioner's
decision to plead guilty." (R., pp.50-51.) Included in the petition was an excerpt of the
change of plea hearing in which Mr. Mendiola had expressly indicated that he was
agreeing to plead guilty in order to protect his family.

(R., pp.51-52, pp.61-62 at

Tr., p.12, L.25 - p.16, L.8.) From this excerpt, Mr. Mendiola makes clear that the only

reason he was pleading guilty was in an attempt to "save his family." In addition, this
excerpt contained affirmative indications that Mr. Mendiola was not, in actually, making
a fully voluntary choice to enter his guilty plea:
THE COURT:

Do you feel that you are making this plea freely and
voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: It's hard to say. I mean, I'm doing it willfully, but I feel
like I'm cornered. I know I understand I got a choice
to take it to trial, but then my brothers lose their deals.
I can't do that to my mama, so I understand. I just
want closure. I just want to get this over with.

-

R., pp.52, 62atTr., p.16, Ls.1-8.
Mr. Mendiola further noted that he entered his plea against the advice of his
counsel, as was evinced by counsel's statements during his sentencing hearing.
(R., pp.52, p.72 at Tr., p.21, L.22 - p.22, L.7.) Because his plea was not entered
voluntarily, Mr. Mendiola asserted that his plea and conviction should be set aside.
(R., p.53.)
With regard to his assertions that his trial counsel was ineffective, Mr. Mendiola
provided evidence, in the form of an affidavit from his mother who was present during
plea negotiations, that the defense investigator in his case had opined to the
prosecutor that Mr. Mendiola was properly charged with murder, as opposed to
manslaughter. (R., pp.54, 79-81.) Mr. Mendiola's defense counsel was pursuing a
reduced charge of manslaughter at the time of these statements. (R., pp.80-81.)
In addition, Mr. Mendiola presented several pieces of evidence in support of his
assertion that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that would
have supported a finding that Mr. Mendiola was guilty only of manslaughter, as
opposed to murder. (R., pp.55-56, 82-95.) Among this evidence was an affidavit from

Marco Garcia, who was present on the evening that Mr. Butler died, as well as an
autopsy report and a toxicology report conducted on Mr. Butler. (R., pp.55, 82-95.)
Mr. Garcia averred to the facts and circumstances on the night that Mr. Butler
was killed. According to his affidavit, Mr. Garcia informed the district court that he was
present in a car with Mr. Butler and Mr. Mendiola, and several other individuals, when
Mr. Butler drove this car to a rural, isolated area in the woods of northern Idaho.
(R., pp.82-83.) After Mr. Butler and Mr. Mendiola walked off into the woods, Mr. Garcia
heard the two men arguing, although he could not hear what they were saying.
(R., p.83.)

When the other men, including Mr. Garcia, went to see what was

happening, Mr. Garcia could see Mr. Butler and Mr. Mendiola engaged in a physical
struggle on the ground. (R., p.83.) Mr. Mendiola then got up and asked what had
happened.

(R., p.84.)

Mr. Butler remained on the ground and was bleeding.

(R., p.84.)
According to Mr. Garcia's affidavit, Mr. Mendiola was visibly upset and told the
others that Mr. Butler had pulled a gun on him. (R., p.84.) Mr. Garcia saw this gun
lying on the ground near Mr. Butler's body. (R., p.84.) Although Mr. Garcia had not
seen Mr. Mendiola carrying a weapon on that day, Mr. Garcia had seen Mr. Butler
carry a gun on past occasions. (R., p.84.)
The other evidence that Mr. Mendiola asserted should have been presented by
his trial counsel at sentencing was evidence that indicated that Mr. Butler's injuries
were consistent with a struggle, and that Mr. Butler had high amounts of several illegal
drugs in his body on the night he was killed. (R., pp.55, 85-95.)

In the State's answer, the State admitted to the factual allegations set forth by
Mr. Mendiola in his amended petition, other than those facts alleged in connection with
his underlying post-conviction claims. (R., pp.97-98.) But the State denied all of the
factual allegations that were set forth specifically in support of those claims. (R., pp.9798.) Thereafter, Mr. Mediola filed a motion seeking summary judgment on his claims
regarding the involuntary nature of his plea and the lack of a factual basis in support of
his Alford plea, or, in the alternative, a hearing on those issues. (R., pp. I01-102.) He
further requested an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction claims regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel.

(R., p.102.)

Mr. Mendiola provided further

argumentation and case law in support of his request. (R., pp. 102-1II.)
The State then filed a motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.117-126.) With
regard to Mr. Mendiola's claims regarding the involuntary nature of his plea and the
lack of a factual basis for his Alford plea, the State asserted that these claims could
have been brought in a direct appeal of Mr. Mendiola's judgment of conviction and
sentence, and therefore were forfeited. (R., pp.117.) In addition, the State argued
against the merits of Mr. Mendiola's claims regarding his plea. (R., pp.118-125.)
Finally, the State asserted that Mr. Mendiola failed to establish that his trial counsel
had rendered deficient performance or to establish prejudice flowing from counsel's
alleged errors. (R., pp.125-126.)
Mr. Mendiola replied by noting that all of his post-conviction claims were of the
sort that had previously been deemed justiciable in a post-conviction proceedings,
coupled with case law demonstrating that these claims were properly raised for the first
time in post-conviction. (R., pp.127-141.) Mr. Mendiola also presented additional

argument and authority responding to the State's assertions as to the merits of
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims. (R., pp.129-141.) Following Mr. Mendiola's
response, the district court entered an order denying Mr. Mendiola's motion for
summary judgment and the State's motion for summary dismissal, but granting
Mr. Mendiola's motion for an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction claims.
(R., pp.149-156.)

In this order, the district court further noted that Mr. Mendiola's

claims regarding the involuntary nature of his plea and regarding the lack of a factual
record in support of his plea were cognizable in post-conviction. (R., pp.150-153.)
Mr. Mendiola testified in support of his post-conviction claims at the evidentiary
hearing on his petition. (Tr., p.85, L.12 - p.p.102, L.15.) In addition, he presented the
testimony of his trial counsel, the attorney for his brother-in-law, and his mother.
(Tr., p.6, L.3-p.85, L.25.)

Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel testified that he had attempted to obtain a plea
agreement with the State that would have reduced Mr. Mendiola's charge from murder
to manslaughter.

(Tr., p.9, Ls.2-11.)

His counsel further testified that, to his

knowledge, no criminal charges were ever filed against Mr. Mendiola's sisters in
connection to this case, although the prosecutor could not specifically remember.
(Tr., p.11, L.16-p.12, L.2; R., p.58.)
During his trial counsel's testimony, Mr. Mendiola admitted into evidence a letter
he has written to the district court that was file stamped several days prior to the date
of his change of plea hearing. (Tr., p.13, L . l l - p.14, L.17.) In this letter, Mr. Mendiola
requested a private meeting with the district court because of concerns that he had
regarding his case. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) In light of the concerns raised in this letter,

and in light of counsel's own discussions with Mr. Mendiola, his trial counsel expressed
the absolute belief that the only reason that Mr. Mendiola pleaded guilty to second
degree murder was to spare his family from prosecution. (Tr., p.34, L.22 - p.36, L.7.)
With regard to the allegation of ineffective assistance based upon the failure to
present evidence demonstrating that Mr. Mendiola may have been acting in selfdefense or that he was, at most, guilty of manslaughter, trial counsel conceded in
cross-examination that he provided deficient performance in failing to submit that
materials that were presented in Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition. (Tr., p.32,
L.20 - p.33, L.9.)

Trial counsel further conceded that the failure to submit this

evidence was not the product of any tactical determination on his part. (Tr., p.20,
Ls.16-20.)
After presenting his trial counsel's testimony, Mr. Mendiola called the defense
attorney who represented one of Mr. Mendiola's brothers. (Tr., p.54, L.15

- p.65.

L.25.) This attorney testified as to Mr. Mendiola's affect during plea negotiations.
(Tr., p.57, Ls.10-21.) According to her testimony, Mr. Mendiola was "very emotional,"
and was noticeably red-faced, shaking, and crying. (Tr., p.57, Ls.10-21.)
Mr. Mendiola's mother, Alicia Mendiola, also presented testimony with regard to
the underlying plea negotiations in his case.

(Tr., p.66, L.11 - p.85, L.25.)

Mrs. Mendiola testified that Mr. Mendiola had told her that Mr. Butler's death was an
accident that occurred during a struggle between Mr. Mendiola and Mr. Butler, and that
Mr. Butler had a gun at the time. (Tr., p.69, L.24 - p.70, L.3.)

She also testified that

she was informed that, unless Mr. Mendiola pleaded guilty, his sisters would be
charged with an unidentified offense and the State would seek greater charges against

Mr. Mendiola's brothers. (Tr., p.74, Ls.14-24.) Mr. Mendiola's sisters have no prior
record of any criminal activity at all, according to Mrs. Mendiola's testimony. (Tr., p.84,
Ls.1-16.) Given these pressures, Mr. Mendiola assured his mother that he would plead
to any charge in order to protect his siblings. (Tr., p.75, Ls.16-19.)
Mr. Mendiola was the final witness presented at the evidentiary hearing on his
post-conviction petition. (Tr., p.86, L.12 - p.102, L.19.) Mr. Mendiola testified that he
had concerns about the plea agreement he entered with the State from the outset
because he didn't believe that such a package plea agreement could be legal.
(Tr., p.86, L.21 - p.87, L.6.) He was particularly concerned with the fact that the State
didn't appear to have any lawful basis upon which to charge his sisters with any
offense, which was part of what the State threatened to do if he did not plead guilty.
(Tr., p.88, Ls.1-8.)

Consistent with his representations at earlier stages in the

proceedings, Mr. Mendiola again asserted at the evidentiary hearing that he would
never had entered an Alford plea of guilty in absence of the threatened charges against
his family members. (Tr., p.88, L.12- p.89, L.2, p.93, Ls.6-16, p.94, L.21 - p.95, L.ll.)
The State presented no witnesses at this hearing, but instead asked the district
court to take judicial notice of the grand jury transcripts in Mr. Mendiola's case, the
transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearing (which were previously
provided in support of Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition), and also asked for the
district court to admit a pre-trial brief that was submitted by the State in support of the
admissibility of statements from Mr. Mendiola's alleged co-conspirators. (Tr., p.103,
Ls.5-10.) The State also successfully sought admission of the registers of actions for
those alleged co-conspirators and Mr. Mendiola's two brothers, a plea agreement with

an alleged co-conspirator, and an immunity agreement with a different co-defendant.
(Tr., p.110, L . l l -p.113, L.7.)
At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the district court asked the parties
whether they wished to submit additional briefing on the issues. (Tr., p.113, L.15 p.114, L.15.) Both parties indicated that they wished for the opportunity to provide
further briefing to the district court. (Tr., p.113, L.15 - p.114, L.15.)
After the hearing on his post-conviction petition, Mr. Mendiola filed a brief in
support of his petition. (R., pp.166-183.) In this petition, Mr. Mendiola discussed the
potential charges that the State was threatening to seek against his sisters if he did not
plead guilty - that they would somehow be charged as accessories after the fact
because Mr. Butler's car was present while Mr. Mendiola was staying with them.
(R., p.168.) He further summarized and presented additional analysis of the claims
that were raised in his post-conviction petition, and the further evidence that was
adduced at the hearing on this petition in support of his claims. (R., pp.166-183.)
Of particular note, in Mr. Mendiola's briefing, he explained that defense counsel's
statement at the change of plea hearing that the evidence presented at the grand jury
proceedings supplied probable cause for the information or indictment was not a
substitute for, nor a concession of, the factual basis of Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea.
(R., p.178.) This is because the standard for probable cause was a lower threshold
than the strong factual basis required. (R., p.178.) Mr. Mendiola further noted that the
district court did not have before it the grand jury transcript at the time of accepting
Mr. Mendiola's plea, and therefore this transcript could not have furnished a factual
basis when it was never considered by the court at the time of accepting

Mr. Mendiola's plea. (R., p.178.) Further, Mr. Mendiola noted that the district court
itself, at sentencing, discussed the absence of any evidence showing malice on
Mr. Mendiola's part, as is required to support a finding of guilt of second degree
murder; and therefore the district court was required to ensure a strong factual basis
for Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea in light of evidence that raised an obvious doubt as to
Mr. Mendiola's guilt. (R., p.179.)
In addition to raising the previously decided claims regarding the justiciability of
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction issues, the State asserted in response that
Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea was voluntarily entered, that there was an adequate factual
record to support this plea at the time it was entered, and that Mr. Mendiola's claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit. (R, pp.184-218.) Of note, the State
attempted to cast the legal analysis of coercion in terms of whether the State acted
nefariously or in bad faith, rather than whether the facts at issue acted to overbear the
defendant's will. (R., pp.196-197.) The State's response to Mr. Mendiola's claims of
coercion was that "[tlhere is no showing that the State acted in any improper way
whatsoever, or in any way outside the normal workings of the criminal justice system."
(R., pp.196-197.)
Thereafter, Mr. Mendiola filed a reply to each of the State's arguments.
(R., pp.222-231.) In this reply, he noted the particular deficiencies in the district court's
colloquy regarding whether Mr. Mendiola's plea was truly voluntary.

(R., p.224.)

Specifically, he asserted that "[tlhe court did not inquire into the specific details of the
package deal or the potential prosecution of Mendiola's sisters or the impact their
prosecution would have on Mendiola's family." (R., p.224.) Mr. Mendiola also noted

that the State's definition of coercion as "something underhanded or sinister," did not
accurately reflect the standard for what constitutes coercion under the pertinent case
law. (R., pp.224-226.) Further, he brought the district court's attention to the fact that
the State's trial brief in support of the admission of alleged co-conspirator's statements
at trial was hearsay that was never considered, on its own, to be evidence in any way,
and therefore this document could not have supplied a factual basis for Mr. Mendiola's
plea. (R., p.229.)
After receiving the briefs and arguments of the parties, the district court entered a
73-page memorandum decision and order. (R., pp.233-306.) In this order, the district
court once again clarified that, based upon clearly established legal precedent,
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims were properly before the district court and
merited the evidentiary hearing that took place. (R., pp.235-243.)
However, the district court denied Mr. Mendiola post-conviction relief on all of his
claims. (R., pp.243-306.) With regard to his assertion that his plea was not voluntarily
entered, the district court found that Mr. Mendiola's assertion (throughout the
proceedings) that he only entered his Alford plea to spare his family was false and was
not credible. (R., pp.244-245, 290.)
The district court thereafter erroneously concluded that, "Giovanni's attorney
stipulated the Grand Jury Transcripts supplied the factual basis for the plea."
(R., pp.245, 299.) Following this conclusion, the district court set out the substance of
the testimony presented at the grand jury hearing in some detail. (R., pp.245-269.) In
addition to the 24-page recitation of the contents of the grand jury transcript, the district
court applied the testimony adduced during the grand jury proceedings to several

aspects of its conclusion that Mr. Mendiola's plea was voluntarily entered and was
supported by a sufficient factual basis. (R., pp.279, 282-284, 290, 293-294, 297-299.)
With regard to the any potential charges against Mr. Mendiola's sisters, the
district court found that the basis for these charges was that Mr. Mendiola, along with
his brother and his brother-in-law "all wound up in Seattle where Giovanni's sisters
lived," while driving Mr. Butler's car. (R., pp.268-269.) Similarly, at another point in the
order, the district court summarized the evidence of any wrong-doing by Mr. Mendiola's
sisters as the fact that Mr. Mendiola went to stay with his sisters after Mr. Butler's death
and because Mr. Mendiola drove Mr. Butler's car there. (R., p.281.) The district court,
at no point, noted a basis in the record to support an inference of any knowledge on
the part of Mr. Mendiola's sisters as to the circumstances of Mr. Butler's death, or any
affirmative acts that Mr. Mendiola's sisters were alleged to have undertaken.
(R., pp.233-306.)
In analyzing Mr. Mendiola's claim regarding the involuntary nature of his plea, the
district court did not apply Idaho case law, but rather analyzed the issue primarily under
federal precedent. (R., pp.269-297.)

The district court further insinuated that no

coercion could be present because the reason why Mr. Mendiola was in the position of
having to sacrifice himself to save his family was because his family "did some very
bad things." (R., p.274.) The district court also, at several places throughout its order,
made an adverse credibility determination regarding Mr. Mendiola's claim that
Mr. Butler was under the influence of drugs on the day he was killed. (R., pp.276, 292,
305.)

With regard to the applicable standard for coercion, the district court

extrapolated that the proper standard was whether the record "indicate[d] something

underhanded or sinister."

( R . p.281.)

Thereafter, the district court denied

Mr. Mendiola's claim regarding the involuntary nature of his plea.
Turning to the question of whether the district court had a sufficient factual basis
in support of the plea at the time the plea was entered, the district court first
determined that, even though it never considered the grand jury transcripts at the time
of the change of plea hearing, the transcripts were nevertheless available to the court
because the transcripts could have been produced at that time. (R., pp.297-298.) The
district court also relied on a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Perez v. Mukasey, in
concluding that the district court could rely on the information contained within the
grand jury transcripts to furnish the factual basis for Mr. Mendiola's plea. (R., p.299.)
As such, the district court relied on the information contained within the grand jury
transcript as supplying the factual basis for Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea and found that
this created a sufficient factual basis to support that plea. (R., p.299.)
The district court also denied Mr. Mendiola post-conviction relief on his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

(R., pp.300-305.)

The district court denied

Mr. Mendiola's assertion of ineffective assistance counsel with regard to the claim that
a defense investigator had made disparaging remarks to the prosecution regarding his
case for several reasons. First, the district court found that there was insufficient
evidence in the record that these remarks were ever made, and the court further found
Mrs. Mendiola's assertions regarding these remarks to lack credibility. (R., pp.301302.) Second, the district court noted that Mr. Mendiola did not provide a basis to
impute any alleged remarks by a defense investigator to trial counsel. (R., p.302.)
Finally, the district court further found that, even if the remarks had been made,

Mr. Mendiola had failed to show any prejudice flowing from the statements allegedly
made by the defense investigator. (R., p.302.)
As to Mr. Mendiola's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the factual basis for Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea, the district court appears to
have misapprehended Mr. Mendiola's assertion, which was that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the lack of a factual basis to support Mr. Mendiola's
plea. (R., pp.55, 303.) Rather than address this as a claim that Mr. Mendiola's trial
counsel should have challenged the lack of a factual basis to support Mr. Mendiola's
Alford plea, the district court appears to have treated this claim as co-extensive with
Mr. Mendiola's later assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of trial
counsel's failure to present crucial mitigating evidence at sentencing. (R., p.303.) The
district court thereafter deemed the failure to present mitigating evidence as a
"strategic" decision and found that the outcome of the proceedings would not have
been different had this evidence been presented.
Regarding Mr. Mendiola's final claim of ineffective assistance

- that

his trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to present several pieces of evidence that would show
that he had not acted with the requisite mens rea of malice and that was otherwise
mitigating -the district court initially made the assertion that Mr. Mendiola "does not tell
us what the evidence is that was not presented that would support his claim."
(R., p.304.)

The court then went on to assume that there was no such evidence.

(R., p.304.) After denying that such evidence existed, the district court then went on to
discuss the several items of evidence that were identified by Mr. Mendiola in support of
his claims. (R., p.305.) The court first found that the affidavit provided by Mr. Garcia

was not credible because Mr. Garcia never presented the facts contained therein in the
presentence report in his case and in Mr. Garcia's statements when he was sentenced.
(R., p.305.) While Mr. Garcia's presentence investigation report was included in the
court record for this case, the transcript of Mr. Garcia's statements at sentencing was
noL4 (Garcia PSI, Affidavit of Cindy OIReilly, Clerk of Kootenai County District Court.)
In fact, according to the clerk for Kootenai County District Court, no transcript was ever
created in Mr. Garcia's case from of the sentencing hearing or the rider review hearing,
which took place on September 25, 2003 and August 18, 2004, respectively. (Affidavit
of Cindy O'Reilly, Clerk of Kootenai County District Court; Defendant's Exhibit 4(D).) A
review of Mr. Garcia's presentence investigation report reveals that he was instructed
by his trial counsel not to provide a statement with regard to the underlying offense.
(Garcia PSI, p.3.) The district court also questioned, a third time, the credibility of any
assertion that Mr. Butler had been under the influence of drugs on the day he died.
(R., p.305.) In light of this, the district court denied relief on all of Mr. Mendiola's postconviction claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, in addition to denying
relief with regard to his other post-conviction claims. (R., p.306.) Mr. Mendiola timely
appealed from the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Post-Conviction
Relief. (R., pp.233, 307.)

Mr. Garcia's presentence investigation report appears to have been sua sponte
incorporated into the record by the district court, as neither party asked for this
document to be admitted or considered during the evidentiary hearing in this case.
(See Tr., generally.)

ISSUE
Did the district court err when denied Mr. Mendiola's petition for post-conviction relief in
light of the numerous erroneous factual findings and legal errors that, cumulatively and
individually, demonstrate that the district court failed to properly adjudicate
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When Denied Mr. Mendiola's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief In Light Of The Numerous Erroneous Factual Findinas And Legal Errors That.
Cumulativelv And lndividuallv. Demonstrate That The District Court Failed To Properlv
Adiudicate Mr. Mendiola's Post-Conviction Claims
A.

Introduction
The district court in this case made several key factual determinations, including

credibility determinations, that were not supported by substantial, competent evidence
when reaching its decision to deny Mr. Mendiola's petition for post-conviction relief. In
addition, the district court appears not to have applied the correct legal standards to
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims regarding the involuntary character of his guilty
plea and the lack of a strong factual basis in the record to support that plea. Upon a
correct application of pertinent legal standards, Mr. Mendiola demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was entitle to post-conviction relief on these
claims. In addition, the district court erred when it failed to properly adjudicate two of
Mr. Mendiola's assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel.
B.

Standard Of Review
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction

Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Workman v. Stafe, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164
P.3d 798, 802 (2007). The applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for postconviction relief is based. Id. Unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however,
an application for post-conviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Id.

Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant. Id. "The application must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will
be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 ldaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136
(2008).
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, ldaho appellate courts will not disturb the district
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 ldaho
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999), citing I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 ldaho
65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App.1990). When reviewing mixed questions of law and
fact, the appellate court defers to the district court's factual findings supported by
substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the relevant law to those
facts. Id., citing Young v. State, 115 ldaho 52, 54, 764 P.2d 129, 131 (Ct. App.1988).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mendiola's Petition For PostConviction Relief
1.

The District Court Erred In Dismissina Mr. Mendiola's Post-Conviction
Claims Reqardina The Involuntariness Of His Plea And The Lack Of A
Strona Factual Basis For This Plea Because The District Court's
Conclusions On These Issues Were Made In Reliance On A Clearly
Erroneous Finding Of Fact That Mr. Mendiola Had Stipulated To The
Evidence Contained In The Grand Juw Transcript As The Factual Basis
For His Plea And The Similarly Erroneous Findinq That None Of The
Evidence Presented By Mr. Mendiola Could Be Deemed Credible

As previously noted, this court accords deference to the factual findings of the
district court.

McKeeth v. Sfafe, 140 ldaho 847, 849, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004).

However, in order to be upheld on appeal, the factual finding of the district court must

be supported by substantial and competent evidence. See, e.g., Stuarf v. State, 127
ldaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995). A factual finding is supported by substantial,
competent evidence when the evidence is such that a reasonable person would accept
that proof as adequate to support a conclusion. See State v. Doe, 144 ldaho 534, 535,
164 P.3d 814, 815 (2007). Likewise, while credibility determinations are normally within
the province of the trial court, these determinations are factual determinations that must
also be supported by substantial, competent evidence in order to be valid. Stuarf, 127
ldaho at 813, 907 P.2d at 790.
Here, there were two clearly erroneous factual determinations that provided
underpinning for virtually the entirety of the district court's analysis of Mr. Mendiola's
assertion that his plea was not entered voluntarily and that there was not a sufficient
factual record established in support of his plea: first, the district court erroneously
found that, at the change of plea hearing, Mr. Mendiola had stipulated to the evidence
presented at the grand jury proceedings as the basis for his Alford plea; and second,
the district court erroneously found that the evidence presented by

Mr. Mendiola was

not credible.
a.

The District Court Made A Clearlv Erroneous Determination When
The District Court Found That Mr. Mendiola Had Stipulated To The
Evidence Presented At The Grand Jurv Proceedings As The
Factual Basis For His Plea And Further Erred When The District
Court Determined That It Could Relv On These Proceedinas To
Provide Such Factual Basis When. By The District Court's Own
Admission, The District Court Did Not Have The Grand Jury
Proceedinas Before It At The Time Of Accepting Mr. Mendiola's
Alford Plea

Pleas that are commonly denominated as Alford pleas encompass guilty pleas
wherein the defendant is unwilling or unable to admit the commission of the charged

offense, or insists upon his or her innocence of that offense, but where the defendant
nevertheless agrees to plead guilty based upon an assessment that the State would
likely be able to procure a guilty verdict should the defendant take his or her case to
trial. See Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). Therefore, it is inherent in the very nature of
an Alford plea that the defendant is refusing to admit to the truth of the State's criminal
allegations. As such, establishing the factual basis for such a plea is essential in cases
where the defendant asserts his or her innocence or there is some indication that the
defendant may not be guilty of the charged offense.
The district court in this case erroneously concluded that, "Giovanni's attorney
stipulated the Grand Jury Transcripts supplied the factual basis for the plea."
(R., pp.245, 299.) In reality, the only thing that defense counsel ever stated was that,
based upon the testimony contained in the grand jury transcripts (which were never
reviewed by the district court at the change-of-plea hearing), the State had probable
cause to file the charged offense against Mr. Mendiola. (R., p.63 at Tr., p.17, Ls.10-19.)
The district court's conclusion that this statement was somehow a concession of
the factual basis for Mr. Mendiola's plea is not only belied by the terms of the statement
made by defense counsel at the change-of-plea hearing, but also by the testimony
provided by defense counsel at the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Mendiola's postconviction petition.
In this case, Mr. Mendiola's attorney made it abundantly clear in his testimony
that his statement was in no way a concession as to the factual basis for Mr. Mendiola's
guilty plea. During the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition,
the following exchange took place between Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel and the State:

Q:

And did you in fact, as you represented to the Court, advise
Mr. Mendiola not to take the plea agreement to second degree
murder?

A:

My advice was it was not factually supported.

Q:

But he nevertheless chose to proceed with that?

A:

Felt he had no choice so that's what he did.

Q:

Well, do you recall that you stipulated on the record that there was
a factual basis for the guilty plea and you referenced the grand jury
transcript?

A:

That's incorrect. I stipulated that the grand jury transcript supplied
probable cause for the filing of an Amended Information or an
Amended Indictment. I never stipulated to a factual basis.

(Tr., p.36, L.22 - p.37, L.9.)
Defense counsel then further testified that it was counsel's understanding that he
did not bear the burden of establishing the factual basis for the Alford plea in this case,
and that the State never set forth any facts that would otherwise provide a basis in
support of Mr. Mendiola's plea. (Tr., p.37, L.10 - p.38, L.ll.) This understanding
appears to be well-founded in law, as pertinent case law indicates that it is the State's
burden to establish the factual basis for an Alford plea. See State v. Ramirez, 122
Idaho 830,834,839 P.2d 1244,1248 (Ct. App. 1992).
As such, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Mendiola had stipulated that the
contents of the grand jury transcript provided the factual basis for his plea was clearly
erroneous. In addition, the record demonstrates that the district court did not review the
transcript of the grand jury proceedings at the time the court accepted Mr. Mendiola's
guilty plea. Therefore, any reliance by the district court on this transcript in reviewing

the validity of Mr. Mendiola's plea and the record presented in support thereof was
likewise in error.
b.

The District Court Made A Clearly Erroneous Determination That
The Evidence Provided BV Mr. Mendiola In Support Of His PostConviction Petition Was Not Credible

The district court in this case made a clearly erroneous credibility determination
when the court found that Mr. Mendiola was not credible in his repeated assertions that
the only reason he pleaded guilty was to spare his siblings from greater criminal
punishment. (R., pp.244, 276-278.)
The district court's adverse credibility determination against Mr. Mendiola was
clearly erroneous in light of the fact that Mr. Mendiola had indicated that his plea was
the product of coercion prior to his plea ever being entered, at the change of plea
hearing, during sentencing, and throughout the post-conviction proceedings. At every
stage of the proceedings in Mr. Mendiola's case, he has consistently and unequivocally
asserted that his sole reason for p!eading guilty was to spare his family members from
prosecution.
In a letter written to the district court several days prior to his change of plea
hearing, Mr. Mendiola expressed to the district court that, "[dleals have been offered to
everyone at my expense and it's not fair." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) Mr. Mendiola further
requested the opportunity to meet with the district court in private so that he could
discuss the issues of his concern regarding his potential plea. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.)
Similarly, at his change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Mendiola again reiterated that he felt
like he was "cornered" and had to enter his Alford plea in order to spare his family.
(R., p.62 at Tr., p.16, Ls.1-8.) When asked a follow-up question regarding whether he

thought his decision was voluntary, Mr. Mendiola responded in the affirmative solely
because his family meant more to him than his freedom. (R., p.62 at Tr., p.16, Ls.9-15.)
These same statements indicating that Mr. Mendiola had pleaded guilty solely to
spare his siblings from prosecution or the threat of increased criminal penalties were reiterated at Mr. Mendiola's sentencing hearing. During his allocution, Mr. Mendiola
stated, "I would not have pleaded guilty to murder if they didn't have my brothers. If my
brothers' situation would have been different, I would not have pleaded guilty." (R., p.68
at Tr., p.7, L.6

-

p.8, L.2.)

He then went on to describe the particular family

circumstances of his brothers that led Mr. Mendiola to enter his Alford plea in an attempt
to spare his family from greater harm. (R., p.68 at Tr., p.7, L.6 - p.8, L.2.)
Additionally, Mr. Mendiola testified at his post-conviction hearing consistently with
his assertions at every prior stage of the proceedings: that he had entered his guilty
plea solely to shield his brothers and sisters from criminal charges, and not because he
was actually guilty or because he believed that the State could prove his guilt of
murder. (Tr., p.88, L.12-p.89, L.2, p.93, Ls.6-16, p.94, L.21 -p.95, L.ll.)
Finally, the district court's adverse credibility determination against Mr. Mendiola
with regard to his assertions that he entered an Alford plea solely to protect his brothers
and sisters from prosecution ignores that this claim was also supported by the testimony
of Mr. Mendiola's own trial counsel. Trial counsel for Mr. Mendiola testified in the most
unequivocal of terms that the only reason that Mr. Mendiola pleaded guilty was because
of his concerns for the potential charges that could be faced by his brothers and sisters.
(Tr., p.16, Ls.4-7.) His trial attorney later testified that Mr. Mendiola, "felt so much
pressure that he felt that he had no other choice," than to plead guilty in order to spare

his family. (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-16.) Counsel would presumably be in an excellent position
to discern the rationale behind Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea, given that trial counsel had
acted in consultation with Mr. Mendiola prior to his plea and had even attempted to
dissuade Mr. Mendiola from pleading guilty solely to spare his family from threatened
prosecution. (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.16, L.7.)
In sum, the record demonstrates that at every stage of the proceedings - before,
during, and after Mr. Mendiola entered his guilty plea - he had attempted to convey to
the district court his concerns regarding the external pressures exerted on him to plead
guilty in order to spare his siblings from criminal punishment. Given the consistency
and frequency of Mr. Mendiola's assertions as to the basis for his guilty plea, the district
court's adverse credibility determination -that Mr. Mendiola did not plead guilty in order
to spare his family from the threat of additional prosecution - is clearly erroneous.
The district court also made a curious adverse credibility determination against
Mr. Mendiola with regard to Mr. Mendiola's assertions that Mr. Butler had been under
the influence of drugs on the day he was killed. (R., pp.276, 292, 305.) The court
repeatedly questioned the credibility of this assertion despite the fact that the district
court was presented with a toxicology report that conclusively demonstrated that
Mr. Butler had no less than four drugs in his system when he was killed: the narcotic
drugs hydrocodone, hydromorphone and oxycodone; and chemical compounds from
marijuana. (R., p.85.) As with the other credibility determinations made by the district
court against Mr. Mendiola, the district court's adverse credibility determination
regarding whether Mr. Butler had been using drugs on the day he was killed is
affirmatively and conclusively refuted by the record in this case.

To the extent that the district court made adverse credibility determinations
against both Mr. Mendiola and Mr. Garcia because they had not provided statements
regarding their charged offenses during the course of their presentence investigation
reports, this credibility determination was improper. (R., pp.290-291, 305.) The record
reflects that both Mr. Mendiola and Mr. Garcia were instructed by their attorneys not to
make any statements regarding the circumstances underlying their case based upon
Fifth Amendment grounds. (Tr., p.96, L.25 - p.97, L.20; R., p.209; Garcia PSI, p.3.) A
defendant enjoys a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at sentencing, and a
defendant's silence cannot be used against him or her to infer guilt. See EsteNe v.
Smifh, 451 U.S. 454, 462-463 (1981); State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 820-21, 965 P.2d
174, 180-81 (1998). As such, the district court's adverse credibility determination based
upon the exercise of Mr. Mendiola's and Mr. Garcia's constitutional rights at sentencing
was improper. See also State v. Anderson, 130 ldaho 765, 770 n.2, 947 P.2d 1073,
1018 (Ct. App. 1997).
Finally, the district court's reliance on its own recollection of what statements
were made at Mr. Garcia's sentencing hearing was improper as a basis for the court's
adverse credibility determination regarding the evidence provided through Mr. Garcia's
affidavit. A district court cannot take judicial notice of testimony provided in a prior
criminal trial through relying on the court's memory as to what the testimony was. See
DeRushe v. Sfafe, 146 ldaho 599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). There was never
any transcript produced or considered by the district court in this case from Mr. Garcia's
sentencing hearing.

(Affidavit of Cindy O'Reilly, Clerk of Kootenai County District

Court.) Because of this, the district court's adverse credibility determination based upon

the court taking judicial notice of its own recollection of Mr. Garcia's statements at
sentencing should be given no effect by this Court, particularly in light of the fact that
Mr. Garcia's sentencing hearing took place nearly five years prior to the district court's
order on Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition. (R., p.233; State's Exhibit 4(D).)
2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denvinq Relief On
Mr. Mendiola's Post-Conviction Claims Reqardinq The Involuntariness Of
His Plea And The Lack Of A Factual Basis For This Plea Because The
District Court Applied The Wronq Legal Standards In Makina Its
Determination On These Claims

A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to apply the clearly applicable
legal standards that are attendant on its exercise of discretion. See, e.g., State v.
Hedger, 115 ldaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). Mr. Mendiola asserts that
the district court's denial of post-conviction relief in his case was an abuse of discretion
because the district court failed to apply the pertinent legal standards when adjudicating
his claims regarding the involuntary nature of his Alford plea and the lack of a factual
basis to support this plea
a.

The District Court Failed To Applv The Correct Leaal Standards To
Its Evaluation Of Mr. Mendiola's Claim That His Plea Was
Involuntarv In Liaht Of The State's Threats To Prosecute
Mr. Mendiola's Sisters, And Seek Greater Charaes Aqainst
Mr. Mendiola's Brothers. Unless He Pleaded Guilty

From the outset, it appears that neither the district court nor the parties
addressed the Court of Appeals opinion in Mata v. State, which sets forth the applicable
legal standards for package plea agreements involving a family member of the
defendant. See Mafa v. State, 124 ldaho 588, 594-595, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259-1260
(Ct. App. 1993). As is discussed in further detail below, a proper application of this

opinion to Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims demonstrates that Mr. Mendiola was
entitled to post-conviction relief based upon the nature of the plea agreement in his
case and his uniform assertions from the time his plea was entered that he sole reason
for entering his Alford plea was to spare his brothers and sisters from the threat of
prosecution.
There are three aspects of the Mata Opinion that were not adhered to by the
district court in this case: (I) the district court applied a legally erroneous definition of
"coercion" upon reviewing Mr. Mendiola's claim that his plea was coerced; (2) the
district court failed to examine whether the court had applied "special care" in insuring
that the plea was voluntary upon learning of the package plea agreement; and (3) the
district court failed to apply the proper standard of "good faith" in determining whether
the prosecutor's use of the threat of charges against Mr. Mendiola's sisters was a
proper inducement for his plea.
The district court erroneously asserted that the standard for whether a plea was
coerced was whether the record "indicatetd] something underhanded or sinister."

(R., p.281.) Under the district court's rationale, the only way a plea could ever be the
product of coercion is in the circumstance of deliberate misconduct by the prosecutor.
However, the district court's extrapolation of what the court believed was required
to show coercion does not comport with pertinent case law that defines coercion for
purposes of determining the validity of a guilty plea. As noted by the Court of Appeals
in Mafa:
When reviewing an allegation that a guilty plea has been coerced we look
to the totality of the circumstances to determine if the plea was improper
obtained through ignorance, fear or fraud. If an innocent person would

have felt compelled to plead guilty in like circumstances, it can properly ne
said that the plea was involuntary.
Mata, 124 ldaho at 594, 861 P.2d at 1259 (internal citation omitted); see also State v.
Hanslovan, 147 ldaho 530, 537, 21 1 P.3d 775, 783 (Ct. App. 2008).
Under the proper standard of review for whether a plea was coerced, the
reviewing court looks to the effect of the inducement on the defendant's will, which is
not dependent on whether the State deliberately engaged in improper tactics. A plea
obtained through ignorance, fear, or fraud is improper because it constitutes a waiver of
a host of vital rights of the defendant that is not freely made; and therefore the district
court's own interpretation of this term was legally errone~us.~
Moreover, the district court failed to apply a standard of "special care" with regard
to the question of whether the record in this case demonstrated that the threat of
charges against Mr. Mendiola's siblings vitiated the voluntariness of his plea. As was
noted by the court in Mata, while package plea agreements are not per se
impermissible, the district court is required to take "special care to insure that the plea
was in fact entered voluntarily and was not the product of coercion." Mata, 124 ldaho at
595. 861 P.2d at 1260.
The concurrence in Hanslovan is particularly instructive on the standard of
special care attendant on the district court with regard to insuring the voluntariness of
package plea agreements:
Though package plea deals are not per se inadmissible, they pose an
additional risk of coercion not present when a defendant is dealing with
government alone. Quite possibly, one defendant will be happier with the
Similarly, the district court's suggestion that Mr. Mendiola's family members may have
done "some very bad things" is not pertinent to the analysis of whether Mr. Mendiola's
plea may have been coerced. (R., p.244.)

package deal than his codefendant(s); looking out for his own best
interests, the lucky one may try to force his codefendant(s) into going
along with the deal. The Supreme Court has also observed that "a
prosecutor's offer during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment
for some person other than the accused might pose a greater danger of
inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the risks a defendant must
consider." Package deals therefore impose special obligations: the
prosecutor must alert the district court to the fact that co-defendants are
entering a package deal; and the district court must carefully ascertain the
voluntariness of each defendant's plea. Because the package-type plea
agreements increase the risk that one defendant may coerce another to
plead guilty, the trial court is obligated to closely scrutinize whether the
defendants are in fact enfering their pleas without compulsion or other
coercions.
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 540, 211 P.3d at 785 (J. Schwartzman, concurring) (internal
citation ~ m i t t e d ) . ~Thereafter, the concurrence in Hanslovan made clear that the
"bottom line" with regard to package plea agreements is that "the trial judge will need to
take a proactive role in addressing and assessing some of these issues before
accepting a Rule IIpackage plea bargain." Id. at 542, 21 1 P.3d at 787 (emphasis in
the original)
In this case, the district court appears to have disavowed any obligation on the
part of the court to engage in a more searching inquiry of the voluntariness of
Mr. Mendioia's plea than would be required in any other circumstance. Instead, the
district court shifted responsibility onto Mr. Mendiola for any lack of a searching enquiry
as to whether coercion played a significant role in his Alford plea. (R., p.276.) As such,
the district court failed to apply the proper legal standard with regard to the requirement

This Court may wish to note that the opinion in Hanslovan was issued a few months
after the district court's memorandum decision and order denying Mr. Mendiola postconviction relief, and therefore the district court was without the benefit of the Hanslovan
opinion at the time it entered the order denying post-conviction relief.

that the court take "special care" and a proactive role in assuring that the package plea
agreement in this case was not the product of coercion.
In addition, while the district court wondered, "what more it could have done," in
light of Mr. Mendiola's equivocal responses regarding whether his plea was voluntary,
Mr. Mendiola had already provided that answer in its briefing to the district court. The
district court could have, and should have, "inquire[d] into the specific details of the
package deal or the potential prosecution of Mendiola's sisters or the impact their
prosecution would have on Mendiola's family." (R., pp.224, 274.) This inquiry should
have specifically included what charges - if any -the State would have any probable
cause to file against Mr. Mendiola's sisters who have no discernible connection to any
of the criminal activity alleged in this case.
Finally, the district court failed to acknowledge, or apply, the proper standard of
"good faith" that has been recognized as the governing consideration as to the
appropriateness of a plea that is rendered in order to protect a close family member of
the defendant from prosecution. According to Mafa, the key consideration for package
plea agreements is whether "the prosecutor's inclusion of the third party was in good
faith." Mata, 124 Idaho at 594-595, 861 P.2d at 1259-1260. "Good faith," in turn, is
determined by whether the record confirms that the prosecution of the third party is
supported by probable cause to believe that the third party has committed the charged
offense. Id.
While the court in Mafa determined that the charges that were threatened against
the defendant's wife were brought in good faith, the basis for this conclusion was an
express stipulation to that fact by the defendant. Id. at 594, 861 P.2d at 1260. There is

no such concession here, nor is there any evidence as to what possible charges could
have been brought against Mr. Mendiola's sisters at all. As such, the record fails to
provide any confirmation, in any way, that the prosecution of Mr. Mendiola's sisters for
some unidentified charge could be supported by probable cause, and therefore be
brought in good faith.
The only possible factual basis for such charges identified by the district court
was that Mr. Mendiola, along with his brother and his brother-in-law, "all wound up in
Seattle where Giovanni's sisters lived," while driving Mr. Butler's car. (R., pp.268-269,
281 .) However, there is nothing in the record of this case that suggests what possible
charge the State may have pursued against his sisters based solely upon the fact that
Mr. Mendiola drove Mr. Butler's car to see his sisters in Seattle; nor are there any facts
that could correspondingly give rise to probable cause to support the unidentified
offense.
While the district court suggested that Mr. Mendiola should have established the
charge that could have been pursued by the State, and what basis might exist for such
a charge, this assertion is not supported by law or reason. (R., p.281.) The cases
cited by the district court in support of this proposition, Mosier v. Murphy and U.S. v.
Nuckols, do not so hold. See Mosier v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62 (10th Cir. 1986); U.S. v.
Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1979). The court in Mosier never addresses whether
the State or the defendant bears the burden of establishing good faith prosecution, but
instead merely notes the evidence and stipulation presented by both sides that
provided a basis upon which to find that the threatened prosecution of the defendant's
wife was in good faith. Mosier, 790 F.2d at 66. The Nuckols Court merely held that it

was error for the district court not to entertain the defendant's assertion that the
threatened prosecution of his wife was not made in good faith. Nuckols, 606 F.2d at
570. Although ruling that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on this issue, the
Nuckols court never holds that the defendant had the obligation to prove that the
"prosecution was baseless," as was suggested by the district court in this case. Id.
Indeed, such a requirement would defy reason in that it is fully within the
discretion of the prosecutor to determine what charges to bring in a case, and upon
what basis to bring such charges. See, e.g., State v. Folsom, 139 ldaho 627, 630, 84
P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Sibley, 138 ldaho 259, 264, 61 P.3d 616, 621
(Ct. App. 2002). As this determination is solely within the province of the prosecution
to make, so too is it the obligation of the prosecution to set forth the good faith basis for
the charges being used to gain leverage in inducing the defendant's plea.
b.

The District Court Failed To Applv The Correct Legal Standards To
Its Evaluation Of Mr. Mendiola's Claim That There Was An
Insufficient Factual Basis Presented In Support Of His Alford Plea

The district court in this case relied upon the information presented in the grand
jury proceedings to provide the factual basis for Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea.
However, the district court erred when it determined that, although it had not
reviewed the transcript of the grand jury proceedings at the time of Mr. Mendiola's
entry of his Alford plea, the transcript could still be considered in support of finding a
factual basis for the plea because such a transcript existed at the time of the changeof-plea hearing. (R., pp.297-298.) The Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Ramirez
is on point for this issue.

In Ramirez, the district court judge who accepted the

defendant's plea was not the same judge as presided over the preliminary hearing, and

there was no indication that the judge at the change-of-plea hearing had reviewed the
transcript of the preliminary hearing when the court accepted the defendant's Alford
plea. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 834, 839 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Ct. App. 1992). While the
Ramirez Court ultimately determined that the district court had a sufficient factual basis
in the record to support the defendant's plea, the court did not do so in reliance upon
any of the materials that were not actually reviewed by the district court at the changeof-plea hearing. Id. Instead, the factual basis in that case came directly from the
specific facts that were admitted directly by the defendant at that hearing. Id. In the
words of the Ramirez Court, the factual basis that was deemed to be sufficient was
rooted "solely on the information ascerfained by the judge at the change of plea
hearing." Id. (emphasis added).
Mr. Mendiola did not make any specific factual admissions at his change-of-plea
hearing, nor did the State offer any specific factual basis in support of this plea.
(R., p.63 at Tr., p.17, Ls.10-22.)

Because the district court acknowledged at this

hearing that it had never reviewed the contents of the grand jury transcripts, this
transcript could not have possibly formed the factual basis relied on by the district court
in accepting Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea.

3.

Under A Proper Review Of Mr. Mendiola's Claims Regarding The
Involuntary Nature Of His Guiltv Plea And The Lack Of A Sufficient
Factual Basis For His Plea, Mr. Mendiola Is Entitled To Post-Conviction
Relief
a.

Mr. Mendiola Was Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief Because His
Guiltv Plea Was The Product Of Coercion. And Therefore Was
Involuntary, And Because The District Court Failed To Conduct A
"Searchina Inquiry" In Order To Properlv Ascertain Whether
Mr. Mendiola's Plea Was The Product Of Coercion

As previously noted, the proper standard for determining whether a plea was the
product of coercion is whether the totality of the circumstances indicate that the plea
was improperly obtained through ignorance, fear or fraud. See Mafa, 124 ldaho at 594,
861 P.2d at 1259. In addition, the district court is required to apply special scrutiny with
regard to such inducements in order to insure that the plea is in fact entered voluntarily,
which also requires the district court to take a proactive role in assessing the risks of
coercion.

Id; Hanslovan, 147 ldaho at 543, 211 P.3d at 787 (J. Schwartzman,

concurring.)
In this case, the district court engaged in virtually no scrutiny of the underlying
voluntariness of Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea. When asked specifically whether his plea
was being entered freely and voluntarily, Mr. Mendiola equivocated, and could only
state that he was "willfully" pleading, but that he was doing so because he felt
"cornered" and because of the punishments that his family could potentially face if he
refused to enter a guilty plea. (R., p.62 at Tr., p.16, Ls.1-8.) Despite the very clear
reservations harbored by Mr. Mendiola, including doubts as to whether the State's
threats of prosecution against his sister were even legal, the district court's laissez-faire
approach to the package plea agreement in this case was not consistent with the legal

standards attendant on the district court given the nature of this plea agreement.
(R.,p.62atTr.,p.15,L.4-p.16,L.15.)

The coercive force of the State's threatened prosecution of Mr. Mendiola's
siblings cannot be overstated -the State's threat was to seek criminal charges against
an entire generation of Mr. Mendiola's immediate family unless he pleaded guilty to the
charge of second degree murder. This fact alone sets Mr. Mendiola's case apart from
those cases addressing the coercive force of package plea deals involving close family
members of the defendant, both arising from ldaho and from other jurisdictions. With
each family member that was threatened with prosecution, the coercive force of these
threats multiplied exponentially.
in addition, Mr. Mendiola's sisters stood to lose a great deal should they be
subject to any prosecution, albeit under a basis that is entirely unclear from the record.
Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel testified that his sisters both had athletic scholarships at a
prominent Washington university, and further had the potential to pursue professional
basketball careers at the time Mr. Mendiola entered his Alford plea. (Tr., p.46, Ls.2-9.)
Given the fact that his sisters' potential futures were at stake, Mr. Mendiola's trial
counsel testified that Mr. Mendiola "was under so much pressure that he felt he had no
choice," but to plead guilty and that Mr. Mendiola would have done anything to protect
his sisters. (Tr., p.46, Ls.2-9.) Under pressures as extreme as these, it is entirely likely
that an innocent person would have felt compelled to plead guilty if put in Mr. Mendiola's
shoes. See Mata, 124 ldaho at 594, 861 P.2d at 1259. As such, it cannot be said that
Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea was voluntary as opposed to being the product of coercion.

In addition, there does not appear to be any evidence in the record that would
establish any good cause for the prosecution of Mr. Mendiola's two sisters. In order for
the threat of charges against the close family members of the defendant to be a valid
inducement for a plea, the threat of charges against the third parties must be made in
good faith. "Good faith has been interpreted to imply that the prosecution of the third
party must be based on probable cause to believe that in fact the third party committed
the crime." Mata, 124 Idaho at 594-595, 861 P.2d at 1259-1260. Here, there is not so
much as an inkling of what possible charge could have been brought against
Mr. Mendiola's sisters, much less what would constitute probable cause for any
unidentified charges. The only "incriminating" facts identified by the district court's order
were that Mr. Mendiola went to stay with his sisters after Mr. Butler's death and that Mr.
Mendiola drove Mr. Butler's car there. (R., pp.268-269; 281.)
Under a review of the record in this case, Mr. Mendiola established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he was entitled to post-conviction relief because
his plea was the product of coercion, and therefore not voluntary, and because the
district court at the change of plea hearing failed to abide by the applicable legal
standards in insuring the voluntary character of Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea.
b.

Mr. Mendiola's Alford Plea Was Not Supported BV A Strona Factual

Basis
In a similar vein, the district court is required to establish "a strong factual basis"
for an Alford plea where there is information that raises an obvious doubt as to guilty, or
where the defendant denies guilt as to an element of the offense, in order to "assure
that the defendant's plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily." Ramirez,

122 ldaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248. And it is the responsibility of the State to present
this factual basis. Id. (quoting Amerson v. Sfafe, 119 ldaho 994, 996, 812 P.2d 301,
303 (Ct. App. 1991)) (noting that consent to an Alford plea is valid if, infer alia, the State
demonstrates the requisite factual basis).
There does not appear to be any room to doubt that the district court entertained
obvious doubts as to Mr. Mendiola's guilt in light of the district court's statement at
sentencing that the court didn't "have a clue, due to the lack of evidence before me, as
to the details of malice and the extent of malice." (R., p.73 at Tr., p.26, L.25 - p.27,
L.2.) As malice was an element of the offense to which Mr. Mendiola entered his Alford
plea, this statement by the district court is the functional equivalent of an admission that
there were doubts as to Mr. Mendiola's guilt.
The standard for whether the State has established a strong factual basis is fairly
high - the proof must be sufficient to ensure "that the defendant is pleading guilty
because he believes the state could, and more likely than not would, prove the charges
against him beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. And, as previously noted, the standard for
whether the district court properly ascertained the factual basis for the plea is
determined solely by the evidence that was actually presented to and considered by the
district court at the change of plea hearing. Id.
In contrast, the determination of whether probable cause exists to support an
information or indictment is relatively low. As noted by the United States Supreme
Court in Draper v. U.S., "There is a large difference between the two things to be proved
[guilt and probable cause], as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and

therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them."
Draper v. U.S., 358 U.S. 307, 312 (1959).
Given the disparity in the standards between a "strong factual basis" and
probable cause, the statement by trial counsel that there was probable cause to support
charging Mr. Mendiola cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of establishing a strong
factual basis for Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea to second degree murder.
Additionally, the record is clear that the district court had not reviewed the grand
jury transcript at the time of Mr. Mendiola's change-of-plea hearing.

(R., p.63 at

Tr., p.17, Ls.10-13.) And the State presented no facts at all in support of the charge to
which Mr. Mendiola entered his Alford plea. (R., p.63 at Tr., p.17, Ls.20-22.) The only
"factual basis" in the record was a concession from Mr. Mendiola's counsel that the
State merely had enough evidence to bring the second degree murder charge.
(R., p.63 at Tr., p.17, Ls.17-19.) This is far short of the strong factual basis that was
required under the facts of this case.

Mr. Mendiola has established, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis
of a lack of a strong factual basis that would support his Alford plea.
4.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mendiola Post-Conviction
Relief On His Claims Reqarding Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel: And A
Proper Review Of These Claims Establishes That Mr. Mendiola Is Entitled
To Post-Conviction Relief

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the
post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323,
1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the

defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washingfon, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); Hasseff v. Stafe, 127 ldaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App.
1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v.
State, 114 ldaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the
applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 ldaho at
761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Generally, tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not
be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation. Howard v. Stafe, 126 ldaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).
Mr. Mendiola asserts that the district court erred when it denied him postconviction relief as to two of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

- that

his

attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge the lack of a factual basis in support of
his Alford plea at the change of plea hearing and that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present certain pieces of mitigating evidence that demonstrated that
Mr. Mendiola lacked the mens rea of malice or otherwise was entitled to lenience at
sentencing.'
From the outset, it is clear that the district court misapprehended the nature of
Mr. Mendiola's assertion that his trial counsel should have challenged the lack of a
factual basis to support his Alford plea. (R., p.54-55.) Instead, the district court treated

'

Mr. Mendiola does not herein challenge the district court's determination with regard to
his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the statements that were
allegedly made by a defense investigator to the prosecutor in Mr. Mendiola's case.

this claim as a further elaboration of Mr. Mendiola's assertion that his trial counsel
should have presented evidence, submitted along with his post-conviction petition, that
showed that he was acting in self-defense or otherwise tended to refute that he had
acted with the requisite mens rea of malice. (R., pp.303-305.) Therefore, the district
court erred to the extent that the court failed to adjudicate Mr. Mendiola's actual postconviction claim on this issue.
Further, the district court erred when it determined that the failure of trial counsel
to present evidence that Mr. Mendiola may have been acting in self-defense or
otherwise was guilty of manslaughter, rather than murder, was a tactical decision.
(R., pp.303, 305.) This determination is affirmatively refuted by trial counsel's own
testimony during the evidentiary hearing. First, defense counsel conceded that the
failure to present the evidence regarding Mr. Butler's autopsy and toxicology reports,
and evidence regarding the fact that Mr. Butler may have been carrying a gun on the
day he was killed, was deficient performance. (Tr., p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.9.) And trial
counsel further testified that his failure to present this evidence was not based upon any
tactical decision on counsel's part. (Tr., p.20, Ls.16-20.) Given this, there is no support
in the record for the district court's conclusion that the failure to present this evidence
was the result of a tactical determination by Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel.
In addition, the evidence presented by Mr. Mendiola demonstrates that there was
a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of his
sentencing hearing would have been different. In particular, Mr. Mendiola established
that, "[hlad an adequate mitigation defense been presented, there is a 'reasonable
probability' that an objective sentencing factfinder 'would have struck a different

balance,"' with regard to the ultimate sentence that he received. See Summerlin v.
Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 643 (9th Cir. 2005). The evidence identified by Mr. Mendiola that
could have been presented by his trial counsel, but was not, included evidence that
established that Mr. Butler was under the influence of several narcotics and marijuana
on the day he died, that he was known to carry a gun, that Mr. Butler and Mr. Mendiola
were engaged in a struggle prior to Mr. Butler's death, that Mr. Butler's body showed
signs of this struggle, that Mr. Butler's body was found with a gun laying beside him,
and that Mr. Mendiola was not carrying a gun with him on that day. (R., pp.55-56, 8295.) All of this evidence tended to show that Mr. Mendiola was likely acting in selfdefense when Mr. Butler was killed or, at the very least, that the killing was not
premeditated or done with malice.
The district court's conclusion to the contrary is in contravention of the very
concerns that the court raised during the sentencing proceedings in this case. More
than once, the district court at sentencing expressed concern at the lack of evidence
regarding the facts and circumstances giving rise to Mr. Butler's death. (R., p.73 at
Tr., p.25, L . l - p.27, L.2.) At one point, the district court even stated that the court
didn't, "have a clue, due to the lack of evidence before me, as to the details of malice
and the extent of malice." (R., p.73 at Tr., p.26, L.25 - p.27, L.2.) The evidence that
trial counsel did not present could have gone far to answer the district court's questions
in the face of a silent record - this evidence showed that there was, in fact, virtually no
malice (if any) attendant on Mr. Mendiola's actions.

Mr. Mendiola was acting in

response to a physical confrontation with an individual who was clearly under the
influence of a variety of controlled substances and who, quite likely, was also

brandishing a gun. Contrary to the district court's post-hoc assessment, this evidence
appears to be squarely of the type that the court previously indicated was lacking in
order to guide the court's sentencing determination.
Given the underlying record of the sentencing proceedings in this case, and
especially the absence in the record noted by the district court of information regarding
the underlying circumstances of Mr. Butler's death at sentencing, Mr. Mendiola
demonstrated that there was a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure
to present the mitigating evidence at issue, an objective fact-finder would have rendered
a lesser sentence. As such, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Mendiola's postconviction relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Mendiola respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying post-conviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 1 5 ' ~day of December, 2009.
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